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Abstract
Promotions serve two purposes. They ought to provide incentives for employees and to
select the best employee for a management position. However, if non-contractible man-
agerial decision rights give rise to private benefits and preference misalignment between
managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker
with the largest private benefit as a manager has the strongest incentives to work hard
to get promoted. This article shows how the interplay of managerial decision rights and
performance-based promotions leads to a situation often referred to as the Peter princi-
ple: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion
prospects. That finding still holds when the firm owner optimally chooses the promotion
rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers. To
optimize organizational design, the firm balances better worker incentivization but worse
manager selection by using performance-based promotions and restricting managerial de-
cision rights.
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1 Introduction
Internal promotions are widely used to fill job vacancies.1 They are ought to achieve
two objectives at once, namely to create incentives for employees and to select the best
managers (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). It is not obvious, however, that the two objectives
are always in line. To motivate employees, promotions must be based on current employee
performance. To select the best managers, they must be based on expected manager
performance. If the two measures are negatively correlated, a conflict of objectives arises.
There is ample evidence that promotions are mostly based on past and current em-
ployee performance (Frederiksen et al. 2019); and the Peter principle states that this
approach leads to worse management selection, in line with a conflict of objectives (Peter
and Hull 1969). That claim, a trade-off between motivation and selection, is substanti-
ated in Benson et al. (2018). They provide evidence that firms rather promote the best
performing employees than the expectedly best managers. Indeed, firms could improve
managerial performance by 30% if promotion decisions were based on other measures than
employee performance.
This paper examines an arising trade-off between the two objectives of performance-
based promotions, motivation and selection. Most importantly, it first illustrates that
such trade-off emerges from misaligned incentives between managers and the firm and the
delegation of decision rights. That approach differs from previous “skill-based” models
such as Fairburn and Malcomson (2001), Lazear (2004), and Schöttner and Thiele (2010)
and from the original intuition behind the Peter principle (Peter and Hull 1969). These
models blame skill differences between employee and manager tasks for bad manager selec-
tion of performance-based promotions. In contrast, my theory offers another explanation,
namely the exploitation of decision rights by promoted managers.
I show that employees who generate lower profits as managers are incentivized more
strongly by the prospect of becoming manager; consequently they are also more likely to
get promoted. The intuition stems from the fact that a management position, i.e. the
promotion prize, entails more responsibility and more decision rights. Yet managerial
decision-making is not contractible. Hence a manager can exploit decision rights at his
own interest; only the preference alignment between manager and principal determines
how private benefits and profits are influenced by the manager’s decisions. Consequently,
lower preference alignment leads to higher private benefits for the manager and lower
profits for the firm.
It follows that those employees who gain more from a promotion because of higher
1For example, DeVaro et al. (2019) find that around 60% of new jobs are filled via internal promotions.
Baker et al. (1988, p.600) state that “promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most
organizations”. For a broader overview on empirical studies, see Gibbons and Roberts (2012).
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private benefits generate lower profits. If promotions are based on employee performance,
a trade-off between motivation and selection arises. First, employees work hard to get
promoted as they are incentivized by future private benefits as managers. Furthermore,
employees with lower preference alignment receive higher private benefits when promoted
and thus they will work even harder than their competitors. Such behavior leads to
a higher promotion probability and a negative selection effect arises: employees who
generate lower profits as managers are more likely to get promoted.
The model further investigates the trade-off between motivation and selection from
different angles. First it examines how a principal should optimally delegate decision
rights when promotions are based on employee performance. Since managers receive pri-
vate benefits from decision-making, the principal could limit their decision rights, and
thus private benefits, by delegating fewer decisions. As a result, bad selection of man-
agers is reduced at the expense of employee motivation. Consequently the optimal level
of delegation balances both effects. One of the main findings shows that partial delega-
tion can be optimal under performance-based promotions: the principal delegates only a
limited number of decisions to the manager as more delegation would attract unprofitable
managers too strongly.
Moreover, I analyze the optimality of performance-based promotions in light of the
manager’s decision rights. If a management position is equipped with many decision
rights, the selection effect will be particularly pronounced. In this case the principal will
not use performance-based promotions to select managers, to prevent those with strong
preference misalignment from rising to the top. I further consider the optimal design of the
organization, i.e. the joint choice of delegation and promotion. I show that (a) delegation
and the simultaneous use of performance-based promotions lead to higher motivation of
employees and (b) their joint use increases if preferences are sufficiently aligned and the
selection effect is sufficiently weak.
The model also offers a new perspective to why we observe promotions at all when
the Peter principle applies. Fairburn and Malcomson (2001, p.45) ask: “Why not (..) use
promotions to assign employees to jobs and monetary bonuses to provide incentives?” I
investigate this question in two extensions. I first analyze how worker wages and delega-
tion interact. Workers are motivated by both wages and expected private benefits from
delegation, implying a substitutability between the two incentive devices. Higher manage-
rial discretion then comes with lower subordinates’ wages. Overall, including monetary
incentives decreases the number of decisions delegated, but, in general, partial delegation
remains optimal. Secondly, I introduce further promotion-related wage increases (Baker
et al. 1994). I show that if such a wage increase is optimal for the principal, the joint use
of performance-based promotions and delegation of decision rights is profitable as well.
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Related Literature. This work combines two distinct strands of literature, namely
that on the (negative) selection effects of promotions and the optimal delegation of de-
cision rights. First, it offers a new explanation for why performance-based promotion
schemes induce inefficient selection of managers.2 While theories differ in explaining the
benefits of performance-based promotions3, they share the intuition behind its inefficiency:
performance-based promotions result in managers with an insufficient skills. Accordingly,
low manager performance arises because promoted workers lack the required skills to be
good managers (Peter and Hull 1969; Bernhardt 1995; Fairburn and Malcomson 2001;
Lazear 2004; Schöttner and Thiele 2010; Koch and Nafziger 2012). The current approach
is different as it is fully independent of skill considerations. In my model, low manager
performance arises because promoted workers exploit managerial decision rights; and they
vary in the degree that they do so.
I also contribute to the literature on optimal delegation in which the principal dele-
gates decision rights to the manager to make him, e.g., acquire information (Aghion and
Tirole 1997), communicate truthfully (Dessein 2002), or exert effort (Bester and Krähmer
2008). In contrast to these papers, I am concerned with the effects of delegation on the
behavior of employees. My model focuses on the link between managerial benefits and em-
ployees’ behavior via performance-based promotions. It is silent about potential sources
of these benefits as well as the manager’s decision problem. Empirical evidence regarding
managerial private benefits can be, e.g., found in the literature on managerial empire
building (Jensen 1986; Hope and Thomas 2008), short-termism (Bebchuk and Stole 1993;
Edmans et al. 2017) and intrinsic valuation of decision rights (Fehr et al. 2013; Bartling
et al. 2014). In general, managerial private benefits can arise from misaligned preferences
as well as ill-designed incentive schemes (see the discussion in Dessein 2002, p.815).
There often exist interaction effects between different dimensions of organizational
design (Roberts 2007), for example between job design, monitoring and incentives (so
called “high performance work systems”, see Ichniowski and Shaw 2003), or between the
hierarchical structure of an organization and its use of promotions (Ke et al. 2018). In
the current model, complementarities between delegation and the use of promotions arise
because delegation increases private benefits of managers and thus the prize for winning
a promotion.
Lastly, my work complements a literature in political economy on the delegation of
2Empirical evidence for that claim can be found in Grabner and Moers (2013) and Benson et al. (2018).
They show promoting high-performing employees correlates negatively with manager quality. More
specifically, Benson et al. (2018) find that firms could increase management performance by 30% if they
based promotions on other measures than employee performance.
3For example, in Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) they prevent influence activities. In my model, in
Schöttner and Thiele (2010) and Koch and Nafziger (2012) and a large literature on tournaments (Rosen
1986), performance-based promotions are used because they act as an incentive device.
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authority and selection effects. Already Knight (1938) and Hayek (1944) discussed the
influence of institutions and political systems on the selection of politicians. Besley (2005)
points out that a political office’s “attractiveness” to candidates crucially depends on the
rents they can extract while in office; these in turn depend on the office’s power. Such con-
sideration will affect who is running for office, “egoistic” or “public-spirited” politicians.4
Similarly, the current model shows that decision rights, the “attractiveness” of a manage-
ment position, attract employees who want to exploit those decision rights. Therefore,
rents to promotion and power must be limited to mitigate potential selection effects. For
political offices, this can be done, e.g., by setting up institutions to align a politician’s
private interests (Barro 1973), his accountability, for instance via re-elections (Maskin and
Tirole 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2010), the implementation of “checks and balances” (Persson
et al. 1997), or power de-concentration (Grunewald et al. 2019). In organizations, the
principal can simply restrict a manager’s decision rights.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the model and then
analyze optimal delegation and optimal promotion rules in Section 3. Section 4 presents
two extensions of the model by introducing monetary incentives for the workers, via bonus
schemes and via promotion-related wage increases. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Overview
The firm consists of a principal (female) and two workers (male). Both workers exert
unobservable effort and compete for a promotion to a management position. The prin-
cipal receives profits from both hierarchy levels, i.e. the workers’ work effort and from
the decisions made by the manager who is a promoted worker. In order to maximize
profits, the principal ex-ante chooses an organizational design that has two dimensions.
Thereby she chooses a promotion rule and the degree of delegation of decision rights to
the management position.
The model is introduced step-by-step. First I present the workers’ effort choice and
how it is shaped by promotion prospects. Then I continue by introducing the management
stage and the delegation decision. The model setup is concluded by bringing both parts
together. The incorporation of wage payments, either to the manager or to the employees,
is relegated to the model extensions in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
4This idea of political selection is prevalent even in science-fiction novels. To quote David Brin, the
author of the post-apocalyptic novel “The Postman” (1985, p. 267): “It is said that power corrupts, but
actually it’s more true that power attracts the corruptible.”
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Promotions and Workers’ Effort
In the firm there are two workers competing for a promotion to a management position.
A worker i exerts unobservable effort ei ∈ [0, 1] on a project at convex effort costs c(ei) =
c
2
e2i . Each worker’s project can either be a success or a failure. In case of success, the
principal receives S > 0, otherwise 0. A worker i’s project success probability, given
by pr(success) = ei, increases linearly in his effort and is independent from the other
worker’s effort.
Workers are incentivized purely by promotion prospects and do not receive any wage
payments.5 The principal P (she) ex-ante commits to a promotion rule. The promotion
rule is fully captured by a promotion probability pi(ei, ej) for a worker i, given i’s and his
coworker j’s effort levels ei and ej.
If worker i gets promoted he receives private benefits as a manager. These are denoted
by umi and will depend on the delegation decision as introduced later. In general the risk-
neutral worker i’s utility function is given by
ui(ei) = pi(ei, ej) · umi −
c
2
e2i . (1)
Promotion Rules
The principal can decide between two promotion rules prom ∈ {P ,R}. The “performance-
based promotion” P is based on the workers’ project outcomes. When only one project
is successful the principal promotes the successful worker. Otherwise, he randomizes
between the workers.6 In contrast, the “random promotion” R is fully independent of the
workers’ work. In that case, the principal randomizes between the workers and chooses
each of them with probability pR = 0.5.7
Delegation
In the firm, a finite divisible number of similar decisions, normalized to 1, need to be
made. The principal P can delegate k ∈ [0, 1] of these decisions to a manager M (he)
who can then implement his favored choice. The payoffs for each decision depend on the
decision-maker:
5In Section 4.1, workers receive additional performance-based wage payments. The main results remain
unchanged.
6In Appendix A, I show that these two promotion rules are superior to any convex combination of the two.
Therefore, if it is optimal not to randomize fully between the workers, it is optimal not to randomize at
all.
7One famous example for purely random promotions in a slightly different setting is that of ancient
Athens. There, political offices were filled via lots to ensure “pure” democracy (see Headlam 1891). I
thank Mike Powell for bringing up this example.
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1. If P makes a decision, total surplus from this decision is pi > 0. The manager cannot
extract any private benefits and thus his payoff is uM = 0. The principal receives
the full surplus, thus her profits are Π = pi.
2. If M makes a decision, total surplus from this decision is piD > pi. But the manager
extracts a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus, and his payoff is uM = αpiD. The principal
receives the remaining share, Π = (1− α)piD.
The principal delegates decision rights over a fraction of k decisions to the manager, and
keeps decision rights over a fraction of (1 − k) decisions to herself. Thus overall payoffs
from managerial decision-making are given by
Π(k) = k · (1− α)piD + (1− k) · pi = pi + k · (δ − α)piD (2)
uM(k) = k · αpiD. (3)
Here, δ = piD−pi
piD
∈ (0, 1) displays the relative surplus increase due to better managerial
decision-making. The setup resembles the main trade-off of a standard delegation problem
in a stylized way.8 A manager makes overall better decisions than the principal, captured
by piD > pi.9 However, delegation also comes with a loss of control which stems from
the decisions’ non-contractibility and a preference misalignment between manager and
principal. The degree of preference misalignment is measured by α. Increasing α implies
a stronger preference misalignment. Profits fall and private benefits rise.
Unknown Managerial Types
There are two different types of managers that have distinct degrees of preference mis-
alignment. Manager types are private information. Each worker i is one of the two
manager types, denoted by mi ∈ {A,B}, with prob(mi = B) = µ ∈ (0, 1). Both types
are equally skilled and generate the same total surplus when making a decision, given by
piD. However, the types’ preference alignment differs. A-type managers’ preferences are
well aligned, B-type managers’ are not. I assume that αB > δ > αA. Thus the principal
would delegate all decisions to an A-type, but none to a B-type manager if she knew the
type.
From a worker’s perspective, a promotion hence yields private benefits of umi(k) that
depend on his private type mi as well as the management position’s amount of decision
8For example, it arises from Aghion and Tirole (1997) with the following parameter values: αAT =
(1 − α)piDpi , βAT = 0, bAT = αpiD, BAT = pi, effort levels of eAT = EAT = 1 and normalized costs of
gATP (1) = g
AT
A (1) = 0.
9Reasons for the superiority of managers’ decision-making include local information that are available
only to the manager (Hayek 1945) or that delegation increases the manager’s initiative (Aghion and
Tirole 1997).
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rights k. Therefore, worker i’s private benefits from a promotion are given by umi =
kαmipi
D.10 I can re-write worker i’s utility function as
ui(ei) = pi · k · αmipiD︸ ︷︷ ︸
umi
− c
2
e2i . (4)
Timeline
To conclude the model setup, the time structure is as follows.
1. The principal chooses the degree of delegation k and the promotion rule prom.
2. Workers are independently drawn from the population with respect to their man-
agerial type.
3. Workers simultaneously exert unobservable effort, and each worker’s project out-
come is realized and observed.
4. The principal promotes one of the workers according to the promotion rule chosen
in t = 1. The other worker leaves the firm and receives an outside utility of u = 0.
5. Decision rights are delegated to the newly promoted manager, according to the
choice in t = 1. Payoffs from decision-making are realized and the game ends.
3 Analysis
In this section I analyze the model presented above. First I examine the optimal choice
of delegation for each promotion rule. Then I derive the optimal promotion rule, having
fixed the degree of delegation. At the end of this section I analyze the optimal joint
decision of delegation and promotion rule. All proofs can be found in Appendix B.
3.1 The Effects of Promotion Rules on Delegation
3.1.1 Random Promotion
Random promotion implies a fixed promotion probability of pR = 0.5 for each worker
that is independent of effort. A worker cannot influence the probability of promotion
and thus has no incentives to work. It follows that eR = 0 for both workers. Then the
principal faces a B-type manager with probability µ, as if there was a random draw from
the population. This is because workers are drawn independently from the population and
10For simplicity, I assume uB ≤ 2c. This assures interior solutions for the optimal effort levels, see Lemma
1.
7
are also promoted randomly.11 Let α = (1− µ)αA + µαB denote the expected preference
misalignment. As eR = 0, projects are unsuccessful with certainty and the principal’s
profits only consist of the payoff from decision-making:
EΠR = µΠB + (1− µ)ΠA = pi + k(δ − α)piD (5)
where Πm = pi + (δ − αm)piD are decision-making profits when facing manager type
m ∈ {A,B}.
Consequently, optimal delegation under random promotion depends on the relative
benefits from managerial decision-making and losses from expected preference misalign-
ment. Note that the principal’s profits are linear in k. Therefore, if and only if the benefits
from managerial decision-making, given by δ, outweigh the expected loss of control due
to preference misalignment, α, the principal delegates all decision rights to the manager,
and none otherwise. This is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
Under random promotion, the principal either delegates all decisions, or none:
kR =
 1 if δ ≥ α0 if δ < α. (6)
3.1.2 Performance-Based Promotion
Under performance-based promotions each worker’s promotion probability depends on
the respective project success. It follows that workers face a strategic game in which
their expected utility and thus their optimal strategy depend both on their own and their
co-worker’s exerted effort. However, workers observe neither their co-worker’s managerial
type nor their effort level. This game is simplified by its binary structure. A worker i’s
expected promotion probability is given by
pi =µ [ei(1− eBj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i is successful
+ 0.5eieBj︸ ︷︷ ︸
both successful
+ 0.5(1− ei)(1− eBj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both unsuccessful
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The other worker is a B-type
+ (1− µ) [ei(1− eAj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i is successful
+ 0.5eieAj︸ ︷︷ ︸
both successful
+ 0.5(1− ei)(1− eAj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both unsuccessful
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The other worker is a A-type
(7)
11Therefore, an alternative interpretation of random promotions in this model is the hiring of outsider
managers. In this case, both workers do not exert effort, i.e. e = 0, leave the firm and receive their
outside utility of u = 0. A manager from outside the firm is hired as a random draw from the population.
All results for random promotions thus also hold for the hiring of outsider managers.
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which can be simplified to
pi = 0.5 + 0.5(ei − ej). (8)
Here, ej = (1−µ)eAj +µeBj denotes the ex-ante expected effort level of a worker with emj
defining the effort level of worker j with managerial typem. The resulting functional form
of pi is a Difference Contest Success Function with unknown contenders (Hirshleifer 1989).
It follows that the marginal effect of i’s effort on his promotion probability is independent
of his expected co-worker’s effort. Therefore, each worker has unique dominant strategy
that is derived by standard utility maximization. Lemma 1 states optimal effort provision
in the resulting Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1.
A worker’s optimal equilibrium effort under performance-based promotions increases in
the degree of delegation and is higher for B-type workers and is given by
ePm = k ·
αmpi
D
2c
. (9)
Workers exert effort, i.e. ePm > 0, only if there is a positive amount of delegation,
i.e. k > 0. Moreover, because private benefits of a manager are increasing in both the
degree of delegation and the preference misalignment, so are expected utility and effort
provision. This is the incentive effect of performance-based promotions. Moreover, since
the preference misalignment of a B-type manager is larger, i.e. αB > αA, B-type workers
exert higher effort than A-types. This translates into a higher probability of promotion
for the B-type. A selection effect arises, stated in Lemma 2a. Note that the selection
effect only arises with a heterogeneous workforce, i.e. if there are one A-type as well as
one B-type worker among the workers. In a homogeneous workforce, both workers are
of the same type, exert the same effort and are promoted with the same probability, as
described by Lemma 2b.
Lemma 2.
Under performance-based promotion,
(a) with a heterogeneous workforce with one A-type and one B-type worker, the following
statements hold if and only if there is delegation (k > 0):
– B-type workers are promoted with a higher probability than A-types:
phB − phA = k ·
(αB − αA)piD
2c
> 0 (10)
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where phm denotes the probability of success for type m in a heterogeneous work-
force.
– The types’ difference in their probability of promotion is increasing in the degree
of delegation: ∂(p
h
B−phA)
∂k
> 0.
(b) with a homogeneous workforce, workers exert identical, but type-dependent effort
and thus have the same probability of promotion of phomm = 0.5.
Lemma 2a says that workers who make less profitable decisions are promoted with a
higher probability. This is a mildly revised, more general version of the Peter principle as
it implies that, in expectations, profits are reduced by promoting the worse manager. The
mechanism in Lemma 2 also implies that a negative selection effect persists even when
the principal bases the promotion decision on other measures than current performance,
provided that workers still can influence their promotion probability, for instance by
shifting effort towards the new promotion measure or by gaming.
Taking optimal worker behavior from Lemmas 1 and 2 as given, the principal max-
imizes his own expected profits EΠP over the degree of delegation k. Since managerial
types are private, expected profits are given by
EΠP =
only A-type workers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− µ)2[ΠA + 2ePAS] +
heterogenous workforce︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ(1− µ)[phAΠA + phBΠB + 2ePS] +
only B-type workers︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ2[ΠB + 2e
P
BS] (11)
with eP = (1− µ)ePA + µePB and optimal effort levels given by Lemma 1. Expected profits
can be displayed by considering each potential workforce composition. For each of these,
profits depend on the (expected) payoff from managerial decision-making and workers’
project success. Moreover, Equation (11) can be decomposed into three parts:
EΠP = (1− µ)ΠA + µΠB︸ ︷︷ ︸+ 2 · ePS︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 2µ(1− µ)(p
h
B − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
Random Promotion︷ ︸︸ ︷
pi + k(δ − α)piD+
Incentive Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
kαpiD
c
S −
Selection Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ(1− µ)(k(αB − αA)pi
D)2
2c
. (12)
Compared to random promotions, a performance-based promotion induces two further
effects on expected profits. It increases worker incentives and thus expected gains from
successful projects (the incentive effect). On the other hand, it worsens management
selection and lowers expected profits from managerial decision-making by promoting the
“wrong kind of manager” with a higher probability (the selection effect). Profit maximiza-
tion leads to the optimal degree of delegation, given in Proposition 2.
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α1 α α2 1
0
1
δ
kP , kR
Optimal Delegation under Performance-Based Promotion
Optimal Delegation under Random Promotion
Figure 1: Optimal Delegation under Random and Performance-Based Promotions.
Note: This is an illustration of Propositions 1 and 2 for α2 > α.
Proposition 2.
Under performance-based promotion, optimal delegation is given by
kP =

1 if δ ≥ α2
k˜ if δ ∈ [α1, α2)
0 if δ < α1
(13)
with k˜ = c(δ−α)+αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2piD , α1 = (1−
S
c ) · α and α2 = (1− Sc ) · α+ µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)
2piD
c .
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of that result. One can explain optimal dele-
gation by focusing on the three effects of delegation on expected profits, as displayed in
Equation (12). First, optimal delegation for random promotion is given by Proposition
1. If δ ≥ α, there is full delegation, and none otherwise. This is depicted in Figure
1 as the dotted line. Under performance-based promotions, two additional effects come
into play. The incentive effect on worker behavior increases profits as more delegation
makes both workers work harder and thus increases the probability of project success, as
is shown in Lemma 1. Generally the incentive to delegate increases if the expected loss
from preference misalignment is sufficiently low, i.e. α1 < δ. The selection effect only
arises in a heterogeneous workforce which occurs with probability 2µ(1− µ), see Lemma
2. It is a combination of two distinct effects as delegation affects both workers’ and the
manager’s behavior. Since delegation affects workers’ effort differently, it increases the
probability that a B-type worker gets promoted, ∂(p
h
B−phA)
∂k
> 0. It also increases the rela-
tive loss in profits when a B-type manager takes decisions instead ot an A-type manager,
∂(ΠB−ΠA)
∂k
< 0. Additionally, there exists an interaction between the two effects. The
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severity of an increase in B-type’s probability of getting promoted depends on the loss
that is related to B-type managers, and vice versa.
To gain more intuition, suppose k = 0. Then, the relative loss and the difference in
promotion probabilities are zero as well. Increase k marginally. The effect of a marginal
increase on profits is given by the marginal increase in B-type promotion probability,
holding fixed the relative loss, and the marginal increases in the relative loss, holding fixed
promotion probabilities. A marginal increase in B-type promotion probability does not
affect profits as the relative loss at k = 0 is still zero, and vice versa. Therefore, at k = 0,
a marginal increase in delegation does not affect profits via the selection effect. On the
other hand, suppose k is close to 1. Then, a marginal increase in k is severe as (a) the
marginal effect on promotion probabilities is large because relative loss is high already and
(b) the marginal effect on the relative loss matters because the difference in promotion
probabilities is also high. Thus, even though profits from decision-making and optimal
effort level are linearly increasing in k, expected profits are quadratic in k, due to the
selection effect. This intuition is summarized in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3.
The selection effect of delegation under performance-based promotion is an increasing,
quadratic function of k, being zero at k = 0. It decreases expected profits for any k > 0.
There are two implications of Lemma 3. First, because the selection effect does not
exist at k = 0, the threshold α1 is unaffected by selection concerns. Secondly, under a
performance-based promotion the optimal degree of delegation is continuous for interme-
diate δ, as shown in Proposition 2. While the incentive effect makes delegation profitable
for δ ∈ (α, α), the convexity of the selection effect makes full delegation too costly if
δ ∈ [α, α2).
Comparative Statics. If the manager’s relative advantage in decision-making is
small (low δ) or the expected loss of control is large (high α), it is not worthwhile for
the principal to delegate because profits from delegation will be low. The same applies if
gains from worker incentivization are sufficiently small because of a low value of successful
projects (low S) or very high effort costs (high c).
On the other hand, delegation is always positive if projects are sufficiently profitable,
i.e. if S > c. In this case, the incentive effect is positive and outweighs potential losses
due to worse decision-making.12 Furthermore, for sufficiently high profits from manage-
rial decision-making, the principal delegates all decisions if the project implications from
bad selection are sufficiently harmless, for instance because a heterogeneous workforce is
12One can see that as, at k = 0, the marginal effect of increasing k on expected profits is given by
(δ − α+ αSc )piD which is positive for S > c.
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unlikely (µ close to 0 or 1). Selection is also a minor concern if the heterogeneity among
managers is low (low αB − αA).
Partial delegation arises whenever gains from worker incentives are sufficiently high
(δ > α1) but the selection effect is sufficiently strong (δ < α2).
Does performance-based promotion always lead to higher delegation compared to ran-
dom promotion? The answer again depends on the relative strength of the selection effect.
It determines the size of α2, the “full delegation” threshold under performance-based pro-
motion. If the selection effect is sufficiently strong, then α2 > α and the principal uses
partial delegation under performance-based promotion and full delegation under random
promotion for δ ∈ [α, α2]. However, if the selection effect is relatively weak compared
to the incentive effect then optimal delegation is always higher under performance-based
promotion. This finding is summarized in Corollary 1 and depicted in Figure 2.
Corollary 1.
Performance-based promotions induce higher delegation than random promotion if µ(1−
µ)(αB − αA)2piD < αS, i.e. if the selection effect is sufficiently weak.
Corollary 1 shows a positive correlation between the use of performance-based promo-
tions and the degree of delegation for a sufficiently weak selection effect. This is consistent
with empirical evidence provided by Alfaro et al. (2016). They find a positive correlation
between a plant’s incentive practices, such as performance-based promotions, and the
degree of delegation from headquarters to that plant.13
3.2 The Effects of Delegation on Promotion Rules
Following Corollary 1, I further analyze the optimal choice of promotion rule holding fixed
the degree of delegation. That mimics manifold situations in which the principal is bound
to a positive degree of delegation, at least in the short term. Reasons include information
overload, time constraints and hierarchical structures within the firm. In the model, I
fix k at k > 0. The principal can only decide on the promotion rule. Comparing the
expected profits under the two promotions practices, gives by Equations (5) and (12),
implies that the optimal promotion practice ultimately depends on the incentive and the
selection effect:
EΠP − EΠR = 2 · ePS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect
+ 2µ(1− µ)(p
h
B − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Effect
. (14)
13Thereby, they use data on management policies from the World Management Survey. Its index on
incentive practices includes two measures on the use of performance-based promotions, bonuses and
talent management.
13
α1 α2 α 1
0
1
δ
kP , kR
Optimal Delegation under Performance-Based Promotion
Optimal Delegation under Random Promotion
Figure 2: Higher Delegation under Performance-Based Promotions.
Note: This is an illustration of Corollary 1. If α2 < α, delegation is always weakly higher under
performance-based promotion.
Thus, performance-based promotions are optimal if and only if the selection effect is
sufficiently small. This in turn depends on the degree of delegation. The selection effect
leads to a disproportionate reduction in profits with increasing delegation. Therefore
performance-based promotions outperform random promotions for sufficiently low levels
of k, as stated in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2.
For a fixed degree of delegation k, performance-based promotions outperform random pro-
motions if and only if k < k
P
= 2αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2piD , i.e. the degree of delegation is suffi-
ciently low .
Note that kP is decreasing in the size of the selection effect, µ(1 − µ)(αB − αA)2piD,
and increasing in the expected profits from motivating workers, 2αS. Furthermore,
performance-based promotion is optimal for any degree of delegation if the selection ef-
fect is sufficiently weak because in that case kP ≥ 1. If the selection effect is strong,
and the degree of delegation is sufficiently high (k > kP), the principal may refrain from
performance-based promotion. This is related to a finding by Benson et al. (2018). They
show that the use of performance-based promotion is decreasing in the manager’s team
size. Under the assumption of a positive correlation between team size and the team man-
ager’s decision rights, Corollary 2 provides an explanation. The negative selection effect of
performance-based promotions outweighs the expected benefits from worker motivation.
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3.3 Optimal Organizational Design
When designing an organization, the principal must jointly consider all dimensions of
organizational design. Only then she accounts for potential complementarities between
different dimensions of organizational design as argued by Roberts (2007). Otherwise,
the implementation of a certain policy on one dimension can well be ineffective, or even
harmful, without complementary changes in another.14 In the current model the principal
jointly decides over the optimal degree of delegation and the promotion rule, i.e. she
chooses (k∗, prom∗) ∈ {(kP ,P); (kR,R)} with
(k∗, prom∗) arg max {EΠP(kP) ; EΠR(kR)}. (15)
Indeed, the optimal organizational design as described in Proposition 3 does make use
of complementarities between delegation and promotion rules. Profitability of delegation
is higher under performance-based promotion practices unless the selection effect is too
strong, and vice versa.
Proposition 3.
The optimal organizational design is as follows.
• If δ ≤ α1, there is no delegation and the promotion rules are equivalent:
(k∗, prom∗) = (0,P) = (0,R). (16)
• If δ ∈ (α1, α], performance-based promotion with delegation is optimal:
(k∗, prom∗) = (kP ,P). (17)
• If δ > α, performance-based promotion with delegation is optimal if and only if the
negative selection effect is sufficiently small:
(k∗, prom∗) =
(kP ,P) iff µ(1− µ)(αB − αA)2piD ≤
[c(δ−α)+αS]2
c(δ−α)
(1,R) iff µ(1− µ)(αB − αA)2piD > [c(δ−α)+αS]2c(δ−α) .
(18)
The intuition is as follows. If benefits from managerial decision-making are sufficiently
low, i.e. δ ≤ α1 < α, the principal refrains from delegating any decision rights. Yet if
there is no delegation the private benefits of a manager are zero and both promotion rules
14One example for a failure of organizational design due to missing complementarities are GM’s invest-
ments in automation and flexibility in its production processes in the 1980s. As GM did not make
complementary changes in other dimensions of internal organization, the investment eventually led to
large losses (Roberts 2007, p.40).
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become equivalent. Thus, the principal is indifferent between the two. If δ ∈ (α1, α],
the principal optimally chooses either partial or full delegation (kP = {k˜, 1} > 0) under a
performance-based promotion and no delegation under a random promotion. But because
kP = {k˜, 1} > 0, zero delegation is dominated under performance-based promotion and so
is zero delegation under random promotion, i.e. EΠP(k˜P) > EΠP(kP = 0) = EΠR(kR =
0. If δ > α, the principal fully delegates under a random promotion. Thus, if she also fully
delegates under a performance-based promotion (i.e. when δ > α2) the trade-off between
motivation and selection determines the optimal promotion rule. A performance-based
promotion is optimal if the selection effect is sufficiently weak. For partial delegation
under a performance-based promotion (i.e. when α ≤ δ < α2), a random promotion
gives higher payoffs from managerial decision-making, but lacks incentives and selection.
Consequently, a sufficiently low selection effect implies that the gains from increasing
worker incentives may outweigh lower managerial profits due to lower delegation.
4 Extensions
This section discusses the effects of monetary incentives for workers and managers on
optimal delegation under performance-based promotions.15
4.1 Worker Wages
Additionally to their promotion prospects, workers receive wage payments dependent on
the project outcome, namely wS in case of success and wF in case of failure. Workers
remain risk-neutral. Furthermore, wages are constrained to be non-negative (e.g. because
of workers’ limited liability). Worker i’s utility is then given by ui = pi ·umi +ei ·wS +(1−
ei)·wF− c2e2i ≥ 0, and consequently optimal effort provision is given by ewi =
2(wS−wF )+umi
2c
.
The principal chooses jointly chooses {k, wF , wS} to maximize expected profits of
EΠw = pi + k(δ − α)piD + 2ew(S − wS) + 2µ(1− µ)(p
w
B − pwA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
− wF . (19)
Introducing the bonus scheme has two effects. First, it motivates workers by giving
additional incentives. But it also decreases potential profits from a worker’s project success
as the principal has to pay wS > 0 to the worker in case of success. Both effects influence
optimal delegation that is determined by Proposition 4.
15One may also wonder about a fully-integrated model with worker wages, manager wages and delegation.
Yet Proposition 5 shows that manager wages are independent of delegation and consequently also of
worker wages. Thus, results for a fully integrated model would not differ from the results presented in
this section.
16
α1 α
w
1 α α2 α
w
2 1
0
1
δ
kP , kw
Optimal Delegation under Performance-Based Promotion
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Figure 3: Optimal Delegation with and without Worker Wages.
Note: This is an illustration of Proposition 4. For any given preference misalignment δ, optimal
delegation under performance-based promotion with additional wage payments to the workers is weakly
lower than without.
Proposition 4.
The optimal organizational design with delegation and bonus pay, defined by {kw, w∗F , w∗S},
is given by
(w∗F , w
∗
S) = (0,
2S − kw · αpiD
4
) and kw =

1 if δ ≥ αw2
k˜w if δ ∈ [αw1 , αw2 )
0 if δ < αw1
(20)
with k˜w = c(δ−α)+
αS
2
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2piD+α2piD4
, αw1 = (1− S2c)α, and αw2 = (1− S2c)α + (µ(1− µ)(αB −
αA)
2piD + α
2piD
4
)/c.
There is a two-fold interaction between wages and delegation that is summarized
by Corollaries 3 and 4 below. First, wages decrease profits in case of success which
in turn lowers the optimal use of delegation. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Optimal
delegation with additional wages (displayed by the dashed line) is weakly lower than
optimal delegation without (straight line).
Corollary 3.
Introducing a bonus scheme lowers the use of delegation if δ ∈ (α1, αw2 ).
Secondly, due to their joint use as worker incentive bonuses and delegation are substi-
tutes as described by Corollary 4. For the intuition suppose there is a mean-preserving
spread in the workforce heterogeneity, i.e. αB − αA increases while α remains constant.
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Then, the selection effect worsens and delegation becomes more costly. Consequently, the
principal lowers delegation but increases bonuses to provide sufficient incentives to the
workers.
Corollary 4.
Higher managerial discretion implies lower wages for subordinates, and vice versa.
4.2 Manager Wages
There is strong empirical evidence that “promotions are associated with large wage in-
creases” (Waldman 2012, p.523). In contrast to private benefits from decision-making,
the value of money is homogeneous for all workers. Thus, it prevents a negative selection
effect. If that is the case, why not incentivize workers with wage increases instead of
private benefits from decision-making? The answer is given below. Similar to a wage
increase, delegation in this model is essentially a linear transfer of utility from principal
to manager. The effects of both incentive devices are mainly similar. But delegation
additionally comes with better decision-making by managers, thus increasing total sur-
plus from management. Because costs from delegation, given by the selection effect, are
negligible for low values of k, delegation becomes more profitable than similar increases
in the manager’s wage.
The principal offers an additional monetary prize of wˆ ∈ [0, wˆmax] to the promoted
worker. A worker i’s utility function is given by uˆi = pi(ei, ej) · (wˆ + umi) − c2 eˆi2. Note
that the wage increase and private benefits are perfect substitutes in the worker’s utility
function. Given the resulting optimal effort level of eˆi =
wˆ+umi
2c
, the principal maximizes
his expected profits of
EΠˆ = pi + k(δ − α)piD + (swˆ + kαpi
D)S
c
+ 2µ(1− µ)(pB − pA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
− wˆ. (21)
Profit maximization over wˆ and k gives the optimal organizational design with manage-
ment wages. It is stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5.
The optimal organizational design with delegation and manager wages under performance-
based promotions, defined by {wˆ∗, kˆ∗}, is given by
{wˆ∗, kˆ∗} =

{0, 0} if S < c · (1− δ
α
)
{0, kP} if c · (1− δ
α
) < S < c
{wˆmax, kP} if S > c
(22)
where kP is given in Proposition 2.
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There are three insights from Proposition 5. First, expected profits are linear in wˆ
and thus there exists a corner solution. Secondly, there is no interdependence between
manager wages and delegation. Thus, the optimal amount of delegation is the same as
without manager wages and equivalent to optimal delegation in Proposition 2.
Thirdly, there exist an interesting relationship between manager wages and delegation
on the extensive margin. If wages increase when switching from a working position to
management (i.e. when S > c), the principal will also delegate. For the intuition, consider
the marginal effects of wage increases and delegation on profits at zero. Remember from
Section 3.1 that the selection effect is zero at k = 0. Thus, the marginal effect of delegation
at zero is given by higher incentives and better managerial decision-making at the costs
of loss of control: αpiD·S
c
+ δpiD−αpiD = αpiD(S
c
− 1) + δpiD. Compare this to the marginal
effects from a wage increase on profits that stems from higher incentives and wage costs,
i.e. S
c
− 1.
Note the similarities between the two marginal effects. Delegation is essentially a
utility transfer from principal to manager. By delegating a decision the principal gives,
in expectation, αpiD to the manager and thereby incentivizes workers. This translates
into higher probabilities of success and the principal’s expected profits are increased by
αpiD·S
c
. This multiplier is equivalent for wage increases. Wages induce a marginal transfer
of 1 from the principal to the worker, to receive higher expected profits of S
c
. After
accounting for the different “dimensions of utility” (monetary payment vs. private benefits
from decision-making) the marginal effects are essentially the same. However delegation
additionally increases total surplus as managers make better decisions, captured by δpiD =
piD − pi. When delegating the principal keeps some share of that surplus increase. This
gives additional incentives to delegate. Consequently, even when wage increases are not
profitable, i.e. S
c
< 1, delegation may still be. Proposition 5 therefore relies on the
efficiency of delegation in this model. In contrast, if delegation decreases total surplus
(piD < pi) the principal only delegates if gains from worker incentives are sufficiently large.
Hence, the relationship between wage increases and delegation on the extensive margin
would be reversed.
5 Conclusion
Many organizations rely on internal promotions to fill management positions, often based
on employees’ performance. Yet this wide-spread business practice can lead to suboptimal
promotion decisions (Benson et al. 2018). Traditionally such findings were explained via
differences in skill sets - employees who are good in worker tasks may not have the proper
skills for management tasks. In this paper I pursue a different approach, showing that
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suboptimal promotions can optimally arise even without considering skill effects. This is
due to the non-contractibility of management decisions. It gives rise to managerial benefits
that in turn affects workers behavior differently under performance-based promotions.
Consequently, workers who make less profitable decisions as managers are promoted more
likely.
I show that such interaction between managerial decision rights and worker behavior
has various implications for organizational design. It affects how many decision rights
should be delegated to a management position (Proposition 2), how promotions should
be designed optimally (Corollary 2) and the joint decision of the two (Proposition 3).
Moreover, optimal incentive schemes for both managers and workers can be linked to
delegation, promotion and management selection (Propositions 4 and 5).
In the current model, workers want to become managers due to a non-contractibility
of decision-making and subsequent private benefits. A recent literature has emphasized
another reason for why individuals value decision rights. Fehr et al. (2013) and Bartling et
al. (2014) find an intrinsic motivation for decision-making. In their experiments, individ-
uals forgo money to make decisions themselves, without any instrumental or informational
advantage. In an organizational context, these “power-hungry” individuals will influence
for instance the optimal hierarchy of firms (Dessein and Holden 2019). Such preferences
for power can also be put into the present context. Workers with higher intrinsic valua-
tion of decision-rights have an higher incentive to work hard and thus will have a higher
probability of getting promoted. Furthermore, as managers such individuals may try to
hoard even more decision rights, for example by acquiring inefficiently many firms and
becoming an empire-builder (Jensen 1986). In this case a trade-off between selection and
incentives arises, similar to the current model. It will be interesting to further examine
how the intrinsic valuation of decision rights interacts with different choices of organiza-
tional design.
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A Optimal Promotion Tournaments
This appendix shortly discusses promotion rules that are a convex combination of random and performance-
based promotions. For example, a firm could probabilistically switch its promotions practices between
promoting the most successful worker or promoting based on other, performance-independent measures
such as tenure.
For simplicity, fix k. Suppose the principal additionally chooses a probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] that determines
the likelihood of a successful worker’s promotion when his co-worker’s project was a failure. ρ = 1 is
equivalent to a (fully) performance-based promotion rule, ρ = 0.5 to random promotion. This gives a
general promotion probability of pni = 0.5 + (ρ − 0.5)(ei − ej) for worker i, resulting in optimal effort
provision of eni =
(ρ−0.5)umi
c . Note that for any ρ ≤ 0.5, eni = 0. Then, the principal’s maximization
problem is given by
max
ρ
EΠn =µΠB + (1− µ)ΠA + 2en(ρ) · S + 2µ(1− µ) (p
n
B(ρ)− pnA(ρ))(ΠB −ΠA)
2
. (23)
Note that the effect of ρ only comes via workers’ behavior. ρ increases average effort provision, but
also increases the spread in promotion probabilities. However, due to the linearity of effort in ρ and the
linearity of promotion probability in effort expected profits are linear in ρ. Thus, a “binary’ solution arises.
The principal either uses random promotion or performance-based promotion. A convex combination
between the two is never optimal, stated in Proposition 6. For the proof, see Appendix B.
Proposition 6.
Either a random or a performance-based promotion is optimal, i.e. ρn = {0.5, 1}.
B Proofs
Proposition 1
Note that expected profits (Equation (5)) are linear in k. They are increasing if δ > α, constant if δ = α
and decreasing if δ < α. Proposition 1 follows immediately.
Lemma 1
First note that expected utility is concave in ei, and thus there is a unique maximum. The first order
condition is given by 0.5 · umi − cei != 0. Solving for the optimal effort level gives ePi = umi2c = k ·
αmipi
D
2c .
Note that because uB < 2c, ePi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i.
Lemma 2
Under a heterogeneous workforce, as phi = 0.5 + 0.5(ei − ej), see Equation (8), we get
phB − phA = 0.5(ePB − ePA)− 0.5(ePA − ePB) = ePB − ePA =
umB − umA
2c
= k
(αB − αA)piD
2c
. (24)
Under a homogeneous workforce, j = i, and thus phomi = phomj = 0.5.
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Proposition 2
First, I show the simplification of the profit function to Equation (12), before maximizing Equation (12)
over k.
EΠ = (1− µ)2 (ΠA + 2eAS) + 2µ(1− µ)
(
phAΠA + p
h
BΠB + 2eS
)
+ µ2 (ΠB + 2eBS)
=ΠA ·
(
(1− µ)2 + 2µ(1− µ)phA
)
+ ΠB ·
(
µ2 + 2µ(1− µ)phB
)
+ 2S ·
(
(1− µ)2 eA + 2µ(1− µ)e+ µ2eB
)
=ΠA · (1− µ) + 2µ(1− µ) (eA − eB)
2
ΠA + ΠB · µ+ 2µ(1− µ) (eB − eA)
2
ΠB
+ 2S ·
(
(1− µ)2 eA + 2µ(1− µ)(µeA + (1− µ)eB) + µ2eB
)
=(1− µ)ΠA + µΠB + 2S · (µeA + (1− µ)eB) + 2µ(1− µ) (eB − eA)
2
(ΠB −ΠA)
=(1− µ)ΠA + µΠB + 2eS + 2µ(1− µ) (p
h
B − phA)(ΠB −ΠA)
2
. (25)
Plugging in (pB − pA)(ΠB −ΠA) = (kαpi
D)
2
2c and e =
kαpiD
2c gives Equation (12).
The maximization problem is then
max
k
EΠP = pi + k(δ − α)piD + kαpi
D
c
S − µ(1− µ)
(
k(αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
. (26)
The first- and second-order derivatives are given by
FDk = (δ − α)piD + αpi
D
c
S − kµ(1− µ) ((αB − αA)piD)2 /c (27)
SDk = −µ(1− µ)
(
(αB − αA)piD
)2
/c < 0. (28)
Thus, the profit function is concave in k. Note that due to the concavity of EΠP , if FDk is negative at
zero, k = 0 is optimal. Moreover, if FDk is positive at 1, k = 1 is optimal. Furthermore, any k˜ ∈ [0, 1]
with FDk(k˜)
!
= 0 is the unique interior solution to the maximization problem above.
1. FDk is negative at zero if (δ−α)piD+ αpiDc S < 0, or δ < α− Sc α. Thus, kP = 0 if δ < α1 = (1− Sc )α.
2. FDk is non-negative at 1 if (δ − α)piD + αpiDc S − µ(1 − µ)
((αB−αA)piD)2
c ≥ 0, or δ ≥ (1 − Sc )α +
µ(1− µ) (αB−αA)2piDc = α2. Thus, kP = 1 if δ ≥ α2.
3. In any other case, we have an interior solution, implicitly given by FDk(k˜)
!
= 0 which gives
k˜ = c(δ−α)+αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2piD .
Lemma 3
The selection effect is given by −2µ(1−µ) (k(αB−αA)pi
D)
2
4c . First note that it is zero at k = 0 and negative
for k > 0. Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t k gives −µ(1− µ)k · ((αB−αA)pi
D)
2
c which is negative for
k > 0 and zero for k = 0.
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Corollary 1
Suppose α2 ≤ α. Then, for any α > δ ≥ α2, kP = 1 > 0 = kR. This implies
kP = kR if δ ≤ α1
kP > kR if δ ∈ (α1, α2)
kP > kR if δ ∈ [α2, α)
kP = kR if δ ≥ α.
α2 ≤ α holds if µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD ≤ αS < S.
Corollary 2
The difference in expected profits, given by Equation (14), is
EΠP − EΠR =2eS + 2µ(1− µ)(phB − phA)(ΠB −ΠA)
=
kαpiDS
c
− µ(1− µ)
(
k(αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
=
kpiD
2c
· (2αS − µ(1− µ)k (αB − αA)2 piD), (29)
which is positive whenever k < k
P
= 2αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2piD .
Proposition 3
The proof for Proposition 3 is completed in several steps. Generally, we need to compare optimal expected
profits under performance-based promotion against optimal expected profits under random promotion.
As in both cases, the optimal degree of delegation is piecewise, we continue case by case. First note that
α1 < min{α, α2}.
1. Suppose δ ≤ α1 < min{α, α2}.
Then, kP = kR = 0 and thus EΠP = EΠR = pi.
2. Suppose α1 ≤ δ < min{α, α2}.
Then, kP = k˜ and kR = 0 and thus the difference in expected payoffs is given by
EΠP(k˜)− EΠR(0) = k˜ · (δ − α)piD + k˜ · αpi
D
c
S − µ(1− µ)
(
k˜(αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
= k˜piD
[
δ − (1− S
c
)α− µ(1− µ)k˜ (αB − αA)
2
piD
2
]
= k˜piD
[
δ − (1− S
c
)α− µ(1− µ) c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD
(αB − αA)2 piD
2
]
= k˜piD
[
δ − (1− S
c
)α− δ − (1−
S
c )α
2
]
= k˜piD
[
δ − (1− Sc )α
2
]
=
k˜piD
2
[δ − α1] > 0 (30)
3. Suppose α2 < α and α2 ≤ δ < α.
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Then, kP = 1 and kR = 0 and thus the difference in expected payoffs is given by
EΠP(1)− EΠR(0) = (δ − α)piD + αpi
D
c
S − µ(1− µ)
(
αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
= piD ·
[
δ −
(
α(1− S
c
) + µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)
2
piD
2c
)]
= piD · [δ − α2] > 0. (31)
4. Suppose α2 > α and α < δ < α2.
Then, kP = k˜ and kR = 1 and thus
EΠP(k˜)− EΠR(1) = (δ − α)piD(k˜ − 1) + k˜ αpi
D
c
S − µ(1− µ)
(
k˜(αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
=
piD
c
·
[
c(δ − α) + αS
2
· k˜ − (δ − α)c
]
=
piD
c
·
[
c(δ − α) + αS
2
· c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD
− (δ − α)c
]
, (32)
which is non-negative if and only if µ(1−µ) (αB − αA)2 piD ≤ [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) . Note that for α2 > α,
it must hold that µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD > αS, but the two conditions are consistent.
5. δ ≥ max{α, α2}.
Then, kP = kR = 1 and thus
EΠP(1)− EΠR(1) = αpi
D
c
S − µ(1− µ)
(
αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
, (33)
which is non-negative if and only if µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD ≤ 2αS.
The first three cases can be summarized as:
If δ ≤ α1 : (k∗, prom∗) = (0,P) = (0,R), (34)
If δ ∈ (α1, α] : (k∗, prom∗) = (kP ,P). (35)
First note that αS < 2αS < [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) . Also for the two cases it holds that δ > α. Further they can
be summarized as follows.
1. µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD < αS < 2αS: α2 < α < δ and (k∗, prom∗) = (1,P).
2. αS ≤ µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD ≤ 2αS: α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (1,P).
3. 2αS < µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD < [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) :
α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (k˜1,P) where k˜1 = 1 if δ ≥ α2 and k˜ otherwise.
4. µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD > [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) : α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (1,R).
Proposition 3 is then a re-formulation of the above stated.
Proposition 4
The profit maximization problem is given by
max
{k,ws,wF }
EΠw = pi + k(δ − α)piD + 2ew(S − wS) + µ(1− µ)(pwB − pwA)(ΠB −ΠA)− wF , (36)
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which can be re-written (analogously as in Proposition 2) as
max
{k,ws,wF }
EΠw =pi + k(δ − α)piD + 2(wS − wF ) + kαpi
D
c
(S − wS)
− µ(1− µ) (k
(
αB − αA)piD
)2
2c
− wF . (37)
Due to the workers’ limited liability, wF = 0 is optimal. Then, first- and second-order derivatives are
then given by
FDk = (δ − α)piD + αpi
D
c
(S − wS)− µ(1− µ)k
(
(αB − αA)piD
)2
c
(38)
FDwS =
(
2(S − wS)− 2wS + kαpiD
)
c
(39)
SDk = −µ(1− µ)
(
(αB − αA)piD
)2
c
< 0 (40)
SDwS = −2 < 0. (41)
First, wS = 2S−kαpi
D
4 is optimal, independent of k due to the independent concavity of profits in both
parameters. Using this, we get
FDk = (δ − α)piD + αpi
D
c
(S − 2S − kαpi
D
4
)− µ(1− µ)k
(
(αB − αA)piD
)2
c
= δ − α(1− S
2c
)− k
(
α2piD
4c
+ µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)
2
piD
c
)
(42)
To find the optimal k I proceed as in the proof for Proposition 2, but the full procedure is omitted.
Proposition 4 follows.
Corollary 3
We need to show that, on the extensive margin, the degree of delegation is lower with bonus schemes,
thus for k = 0, we have that αw1 > α1 and for k = 1, we have that αw2 > α2. On the intensive margin,
we need to show that k˜ > k˜w.
1. αw1 > α1 holds as α− αS2cx > α− αSc .
2. αw2 > α2 holds as αw2 = α2 + αS2c +
(αpiD)
2
4c .
3. k˜ > k˜w holds as
k˜ =
c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD
>
(c(δ − α) + αS2 )
µ(1− µ) (αB − αA)2 piD + α2piD4
= k˜w, (43)
as the RHS’s numerator is smaller and denominator is larger.
Corollary 4
This follows directly from Proposition 4 as ∂w
S
∂kw = −αpi
D
4 for δ ∈ [αw1 , αw2 ) (and otherwise kw is constant).
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Proposition 5
The first-order conditions with respect to wˆ and k are given by
∂EˆΠ
∂wˆ
=
S
c
− 1 != 0 (44)
∂EˆΠ
∂k
= (δ − α)piD + αpi
D
c
S − kµ(1− µ)
(
(αB − αA)piD
)2
c
!
= 0 (45)
First note that the FOCs are independent. Secondly, FOCkˆ is the same as in Proposition 2 and the
optimal amount of delegation is given by kP . Thirdly, to analyze when a positive amount of wˆ or kˆ is
optimal, look at the behavior at wˆ = 0, and k = 0.
∂EΠˆ
∂w
|wˆ=0 = S
c
− 1 (46)
∂EΠˆ
∂k
|k=0 = δpiD + αpiD · (S
c
− 1). (47)
Thus, ∂EˆΠ∂wˆ |wˆ=0> 0 if and only if S > c which in turn implies that ∂EˆΠ∂kˆ |k=0> 0. Also,
∂EˆΠ
∂kˆ
|k=0> 0 if
and only if S > c(1− δα ). Taken together, the three cases stated in Proposition 5 arise.
Proposition 6
First note en(ρ) = (ρ−0.5)kαpi
D
2c and p
n
B(ρ) − pnA(ρ) = (ρ−0.5)k(αB−αA)pi
D
2c . Then the first-order derivative
of expected profits is ∂EΠ
n
∂ρ =
kαpiDS
c −µ(1−µ)
(k(αB−αA)piD)2
2c , which is independent of ρ. Thus a binary
solution is optimal. Since ρ < 12 would imply e < 0 we can restrict the possible set of solutions to
ρn ∈ { 12 ; 1}. Thus either random or performance-based promotions optimally emerge.
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